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Analysis of prices paid by low-income
countries - how price sensitive is
government demand for medicines?
Divya Srivastava1* and Alistair McGuire2
Abstract
Background: Access to medicines is an important health policy issue. This paper considers demand structures in a
selection of low-income countries from the perspective of public authorities as the evidence base is limited. Analysis
of the demand for medicines in low-income countries is critical for effective pharmaceutical policy where regulation
is less developed, health systems are cash constrained and medicines are not typically subsidised by a public health
insurance system
Methods: This study analyses the demand for medicines in low-income countries from the perspective of the prices paid
by public authorities. The analysis draws on a unique dataset from World Health Organization (WHO) and Health Action
International (HAI) using 2003 data on procurement prices of medicines across 16 low-income countries covering 48
branded drugs and 18 therapeutic categories. Variation in prices, the mark-ups over marginal costs and estimation of price
elasticities allows assessment of whether these elasticities are correlated with a country’s national income.
Results: Using the Ramsey pricing rule, the study’s findings suggest that substantial cross-country variation in prices and
mark-ups exist, with price elasticities ranging from -1 to -2, which are weakly correlated with national income.
Conclusions: Government demand for medicines thus appears to be price elastic, raising important policy implications
aimed at improving access to medicines for patients in low-income countries.
Keywords: Medicines, Low-income countries, Pharmaceutical policy, Health policy, Government procurement
Background
Access to medicines is an important health policy issue.
This paper considers demand structures in a selection of
low-income countries from the perspective of public au-
thorities. Analysis of the demand for medicines in low-
income countries is critical for effective pharmaceutical
policy where regulation is less developed, health systems
are cash constrained and medicines are not typically
subsidised by a public health insurance system.
The standard economic approach for measuring de-
mand for a commodity is to calculate price elasticities,
which requires data on prices and volumes. Low-income
countries, in general, do not have robust data on prices
and the quantities of medicines consumed. The estimation
of price elasticities through conventional approaches is
generally not possible and therefore, consequently there is
little evidence on the price responsiveness either at the pa-
tient level or at the level of sales to government purchasers.
There is a gap in basic empirical evidence that arises
through an acute lack of data. Recent health related surveys
have only begun to collect information on medicine prices
but volume information is still lacking in many low-income
countries.
For this study, information on procurement prices was
accessible but volume information for sales to government
purchasers was not. This data constraint limits the ability
of policy makers to assess the impact that price regulation
may have on the up-take of and access to medicines. To
overcome the lack of volume information, information on
prices and proxy estimates of price-cost mark-ups were
used in conjunction with the general Ramsey formula to
calculate the responsiveness of demand to product price.
The use of Ramsey formula, allows demand responsiveness
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to be back-calculated as it is based on price-cost mark-ups,
expressed as a fraction of price, being inversely related to
their demand elasticities [1].
This model allows the pubic regulator to determine
the optimal level of taxation of commodities to generate
revenue, while trying to address distortions in the mar-
ket. According to the Ramsey rule, a least distortionary
tax is one where the tax is greatest on inelastic demands
as this raises the consumer borne price over the mar-
ginal cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of de-
mand. The Ramsey pricing formula, commonly referred
to as the inverse-elasticity rule, is:
Pi ! −Ci
Pi! ¼
λ
ni
ð1Þ
where ni≡
−Pi ∂Qi=∂Pið Þ
Qi
, the price elasticity of demand, Pi!−CiPi! ,
is the price-marginal cost mark-up over price, and λ is a
constant (normally reflecting a total revenue constraint in
general application). Before turning to the application
of this rule, we give some background on the global
pharmaceutical sector.
Due to the patenting of medicines, markets are charac-
terised by the presence of a monopoly element. From the
perspective of the firm, the pricing rules for a monopolist
according to economic theory would see price set well
above marginal cost.
Since prices of medicines in high-income countries
would be unaffordable for low-income countries, the
Ramsey pricing rule has been proposed as a potential
policy response for low-income countries [2]. According
to this rule, prices should be closer to marginal cost
where the demand for medicines is more sensitive to
price. Where demand is not sensitive to the medicine’s
price, then price could be set at high levels to cross-
subsidise low-income markets. From the firm’s perspec-
tive, if country markets are well segmented, intellectual
property rights (IPRs) are protected globally and there is
little threat of parallel trade or leakage into other country
markets, Ramsey pricing could be used to establish afford-
ability in different market environments. To implement
Ramsey pricing however, the firm, requires adequate infor-
mation about demand. Where such information is not
forthcoming it has been proposed that a country’s income
could be used as a proxy for a country’s price elasticity
within the Ramsey approach to setting procurement prices
in low-income countries [3].
The pharmaceutical industry is a global business and
such cross-subsidisation strategies are an attractive mech-
anism to allow market exploitation across individual coun-
tries. Global sales in 2011 show that high-income regions
such as North America (36%), Europe (24%) and Japan
(12%) account for 72% of total pharmaceutical spending;
branded drugs account for 63% of total pharmaceutical
spending, but this is expected to decline as product devel-
opment wanes and patents on existing products expire,
leading to a rise in generic drug spending [4]. The pharma-
ceutical market is characterised as having high fixed costs,
which may or may not be exclusively attributable to Re-
search and Development (R&D). Some evidence suggests
the average expenditure on R&D alone is $802 million per
approved new drug [5]. R&D is considered an international
activity (a fixed cost relative to the global market) be-
cause it can be located anywhere in the world and once
the drug is developed, R&D expense is a sunk cost [6].
The remaining market access costs are specific to the
country of sale and include distribution costs, market-
ing costs and interactions with government authorities
for pricing and reimbursement negotiations [6].
These features of the pharmaceutical market highlight
the important relationship between the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and the individual country regulators that purchase
drugs on behalf of their population. High-income countries
generate larger sales for the pharmaceutical industry with
respect to volume and also have a higher degree of market
power as a monopsonist when negotiating with firms due
to the potentially high profit stream available in that coun-
try. Low-income countries are cash constrained, do not re-
flect high profit markets and as a result, do not have the
same degree of buyer power in price negotiations.
The definition of pharmaceutical prices depends on
where they occur in the supply chain (e.g. ex-manufacturer,
or patient retail price). This study draws on upstream
prices. Empirical work has commonly used upstream
prices, such as ex-manufacturer prices, and country level
measures of income [7-12]. One study found that besides
per capita income, regulation played a critical role in
explaining global price variation [7]. Furthermore, direct
price control measures were found to result in an aver-
age 20% price reduction. Policies such as procurement
through a central government agency, and promotion of
generics also contributed to lowering the general price
level of pharmaceuticals.
Other work has found that per capita income helped to
explain global price differences, but that this relationship
weakened over time as pharmaceutical firms offered dis-
counts within individual countries that were unrelated to
per capita income [8]. A relationship between price and
income was found in high-income countries only [9,11].
In less affluent countries in Latin America for example,
high drug prices appear to partly reflect the skewed in-
come distribution of income and the manufacturer’s ten-
dency to target prices to the affluent minority [11]. Recent
work on a select number of middle and low-income coun-
tries analysed the determinants of ex-manufacturer prices
for originator and generic drugs as well as retail prices for
drugs to treat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria [12]. The study
concludes that an income elasticity which ranges from 0
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to 0.10 suggests that drugs are unaffordable because
within-country income contributes to relatively high
prices. Tendered procurement using data from large non-
government organisations imposes quality standards and
reduces the prices of originator and generic drugs com-
pared with their respective retail pharmacy prices. Overall
drug prices remain unaffordable for the majority popula-
tion, contributing to a lower per capita use of drugs in
these countries.
Descriptive analysis has also found differences in prices
for the same drug across countries with similar income
levels [13-15] and within countries [16]. The vast majority
of the literature has thus concentrated on the relationship
observed across readily available data on price and income.
The aim of this paper is to provide complementary
evidence on the pattern of demand in low-income coun-
tries through the estimation of price elasticities. The
focus of the study is on government behaviour and buy-
ing power. The interest is to study and understand govern-
ment behaviour regarding drug procurement, with price
being the main response variable. The study uses govern-
ment procurement (upstream) price data at the molecule
level or price per pill that was aggregated up to pack size,
drawing on a large cross-sectional sample of low-income
countries. The study has three objectives: to explore the
variation in pharmaceutical prices and price mark-ups; to
investigate the price sensitivity at the government level
and compute price elasticities for sales to government pur-
chasers; and to analyse the relationship between these esti-
mated price elasticities and income.
Methods
The empirical approach to calculate price elasticities
adopted the formulation of Ramsey pricing given as:
Pj−MCj
Pj
¼ 1
−εj
ð2Þ
where 1−εj is the inverse elasticity of demand, the pro-
curement pack price of the branded medicine is Pj for
medicine j, and MCj is the marginal production cost for
product j. A true estimate of the marginal cost (MCj) of
producing a given drug is not available so the pack price
of the available generic substitute medicine was used as
a proxy estimate of the marginal cost. Theory assumes
that once generic firms enter the market, the price of
the medicine falls and approaches to marginal cost, as
the number of generic firms increases [17].
The model assumes that pharmaceutical firms are profit
maximisers, they have fixed costs, break-even (hence the
inverse elasticity formula has no constant in the numer-
ator on the right hand side of (2), and our back-
calculations are lower end estimates), and marginal costs
are not zero. The model further assumes that cross-price
elasticities for branded products are zero, and that there
are no perfect complements. It is also assumed that for
branded products there remains a monopoly element, that
price is related to demand and that firms are aware of
product price-cost mark-ups.
The left hand side of equation (2) estimates the differ-
ences between price and marginal cost as a fraction of
price. The left hand side of the equation should be in-
versely related to the demand elasticity. Prices were kept
at the presentation level to provide price elasticity esti-
mates at the molecule level.
Data and variables
The dataset comes from the World Health Organization
(WHO) and Health Action International (HAI) database
for one year, 2003 [18]. The price information covers 18
therapeutic areas and 48 branded drugs in 16 countries:
China (sampled in Shandong and Shanghai), Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia,
Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, South
Africa (region of Kwa-Zulu-Natal), Syria, Tunisia, and
Uganda. Government procurement price for the origin-
ator branded drug in each country is used. All prices
were provided in US dollars for the year 2003.
By way of background the countries in the sample had
GDP per capita that ranged from 982 $ current inter-
national dollars in Nigeria to 20280 in Kuwait as shown in
Figure 1. Countries also varied in how much they spent on
health as a share of GDP from 2.2% in Pakistan to 11.6%
in Lebanon.
Procurement prices are the prices that governments and
other central purchasers pay to procure medicines, and
are generally obtained through a tendering process. The
procurement prices for the public sector are either col-
lected in the administrative centre (procurement offices or
central medical stores). In a few situations, the procure-
ment prices included local taxes and handling charges
[18]. The data on procurement come from central or re-
gional authorities or the Ministry of Health for 9 out of
the 16 countries. Four out of the 16 countries used a com-
bination of data from both procurement authorities and
government affiliated public hospitals, while the remaining
four collected procurement data from either government
hospitals, or tenders from wholesalers.
Prices for each country are presented as the median
price at the presentation level: drug molecule name; pack
size and strength. The 18 therapeutic areas and 48 drugs
covered are: antacids (2); antibiotics (6); antifungal (3);
antihistamine (1); anti-infective (1); anti-inflammatory (2);
anti-parasitic (2); antiviral (4); asthma (2); cardiovascular
disease (14); contraceptive (1); diabetes (3); and nervous
system disorders (7). The top therapeutic categories with
the most number of observations, (17 for antihypertensives
and antibiotics; 15 for epileptic drugs), are found in Table 1.
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Data on marginal costs were required, but these were
unavailable for branded drugs. The closest proxy available
was the price of the relevant generic drug in the national
market. This information implies that for the majority of
countries, the branded drugs studied were off-patent. For
a small number of drugs, generic product data were used,
and for the remaining, the average international procure-
ment price was used as a proxy. Information on these
average prices was supplied from Management Science for
Health (MSH). MSH maintains a database of international
procurement prices offered by international suppliers to
low-income countries. This dataset is a standard source of
international procurement prices and is considered a gold
standard [19].
In this study, two-thirds of the observations used the
MSH reference price where there was no generic in the
market and one-third of the observations used a generic
price that was available in the market to calculate the
price elasticity. There were, however, no systematic dif-
ferences (e.g. by therapeutic category or by country) in the
computed price elasticities between the set of data that
use the MSH price compared with the generic price. The
cross-sectional nature of this study cannot capture the
lagged or residual price of effect when there are generic
equivalents in the market. One reason might be that ge-
nerics in these country settings are not real substitutes
and do not act as a constraint as observed in high-income
countries. In middle and low-income these settings, there
is evidence to suggest that generics are perceived as low
quality [12]. This suggests that other factors could drive
price differences between originators and their equiva-
lents, such as regulatory skill and procurement ability.
While the WHO/HAI survey attempted to collect price
information on the same drug in each country, this was not
always possible. A final total of 139 observations were
therefore available for analysis. In the data sample, the high-
est number of countries with the same drug was 7 for
carbamazepine (treatment of epilepsy), and 6 for both cef-
triaxone (antibiotic) and salbutamol (treatment of asthma).
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics
Prices of medicines show significant variation by thera-
peutic class of drugs and even within therapeutic classes
across countries. Medicines are typically available in pack
(e.g. pack of 25 tablets, 50, etc.). Branded prices sold ac-
cording to their packs ranged from US$ 325 (fluconazole
in Tunisia, and zidovudine and nevirapine in Lebanon) to
less than a US$ 1. Antiviral drugs had the highest prices
per pack while most antibiotics (except for ciproflaxin)
were the least expensive for both branded and generics.
Most medicines were priced at less than US$ 50 with
Jordan and Kazakhstan having the lowest prices. The
top prices of generics per pack ranged from US$ 162
(indinavir, zidovudine, nevirapine in Morocco, Malaysia
and Lebanon, respectively) to less than US$ 1. Most medi-
cines were priced less than US$ 10, with Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan having the lowest prices.
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Table 1 Summary of drug data
Molecule name Therapeutic category Observations Dose Countries
Carbamazepine Epilepsy 8 200 mg China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, Syria
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic 7 1 g China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa
Salbutamol Asthma 7 0.1 mg China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Uganda
Fluoxetine Antidepressant 6 20 mg China, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Tunisia
Metformin Diabetes 6 500 mg China, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines
Aciclovir Antiviral 5 200 mg Jordan, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Syria, Tunisia
Amitriptyline Antidepressant 5 25 mg Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia
Captopril Antihypertensive 5 25 mg Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic 5 500 mg Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory 5 25 mg China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Philippines, Syria
Phenytoin Epilepsy 5 100 mg Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Tunisia
Beclometasone Asthma 4 50 mcg China, Morocco, Peru
Diazepam Anxiolytic 4 5 mg Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia
Losartan Antihypertensive 4 50 mg China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia
Omeprazole Antacid 4 20 mg China, Philippines, South Africa
Ranitidine Antacid 4 150 mg Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Philippines,Syria
Fluconazole Antifungal 3 200 mg South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic 3 25 mg Jordan, Morocco, Peru
Indinavir Antiviral 3 400 mg Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco
Loratadine Antihistamine 3 10 mg China, Malaysia, Syria
Simvastatin Lipid lowering 3 20 mg China, Jordan, Malaysia
Zidovudine Antiviral 3 100 mg Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco
Amlodipine Calcium channel blocker 2 5 mg China, Malaysia
Atenolol Antihypertensive 2 50 mg Philippines, Syria
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic 2 8 + 40 mg/ml Syria, Tunisia
Fluconazole Antifungal 2 150 mg Jordan, Kazakhstan
Furosemide Diueretic 2 40 mg Jordan, Philippines
Mebendazole Antiparasitic 2 100 mg Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
Metronidazole Antiparasitic 2 500 mg Philippines, Syria
Nevirapine Antiviral 2 200 mg Lebanon, Morocco
Nifedipine retard Anti hypertensive 2 20 mg Kuwait, Morocco
Pyrazinamide Antiinfectives 2 500 mg Morocco, Philippines
Valproic acid Epilepsy 2 200 mg Malaysia, Morocco
Acetylsalicylic acid Anti-inflammatory 1 NA Morocco
Amoxicillin Antibiotic 1 250 mg Jordan
Benzathine benzylpenicillin Antibiotic 1 1.2 MIU vial Morocco
Cefradine Antibiotic 1 NA China
Chloroquine Antimalarial 1 NA Tunisia
Cimetidine Antacid 1 NA China
Digoxin Cardio therapy 1 0.25 mg Philippines
Diltiazem Calcium channel blocker 1 60 mg Jordan
Enalapril Antihypertensive 1 20 mg Jordan
Glibenclamide Diabetes 1 5 mg Philippines
Gliclazide Diabetes 1 NA China
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Price comparisons of medicines are difficult when pack
sizes vary. Prices can be normalised by taking the unit
price which allows for more straightforward comparisons.
The wide variability in prices per pill was examined by cal-
culating the standard error for each molecule. Figure 2,
which shows the standard error in prices by pill, reveals
wide variations for certain antifungal and antibiotics drugs.
A similar pattern was observed by pack size (not shown).
Mark-ups were computed for each drug and averaged
for each country. The data indicate that mark-ups vary
across the countries ranging from 50% to 100% with Peru
(50%), Jordan (60%) having the lowest and South Africa,
Philippines and Kyrgyzstan having the highest (90% to
100%) as shown in the Figure 3. Most countries have
average mark-ups ranging between 70% and 80%. Un-
regulated mark-ups along the supply chain have shown
to contribute to high retail prices of medicines in low-
income countries [18,20].
Price elasticity estimates
Price elasticities were back-calculated using the Ramsey
rule as shown in equation (2). Details are found in Table 2.
Estimates of the price elasticities for different therapeutic
products and countries range from between -1 to -2.
These findings suggest that if the procurement price of
the drug increases by 10%, demand for the drug would
drop by 10% to 20%. This implies that low-income coun-
tries are more responsive to changes in the prices of medi-
cines and, assuming these estimates are a good first
approximation, certainly more responsive than high-
income countries.
Figure 4 displays the across country estimates. Similar
results show that across drugs, estimates are also fairly
consistent. The outliers appear random, which suggests no
systematic bias in the results, either by country or by drug.
Out of 139 observations, 49 further estimates were
dropped for two reasons. In the first case, observations
Table 1 Summary of drug data (Continued)
Insulin neutral Diabetes 1 100 ml Kuwait
Isosorbide dinitrate Cardio therapy 1 10 mg Philippines
Itraconazole Antifungal 1 100 mg Malaysia
Lisinopril Antihypertensive 1 10 mg Kuwait
Medroxyprogesterone Contraceptive 1 150 mg Kazakhstan
Methyldopa Antihypertensive 1 250 mg Jordan
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory 1 500 mg Syria
Prazosin Antihypertensive 1 1 mg Malaysia
Streptomycin Antibiotic 1 1 g vial Morocco
Source: WHO/HAI 2006.
Note Due to lack of data, price elasticities could not be calculated for the following: Acetylsalicylic acid; Cefradine; Chloroquine; Cimetidine; and Glicazide”.
Note: Data from China were sampled in two regions, which resulted in two observations for this country. The corresponding elasticities were calculated separately.
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Figure 2 Standard error in prices per pill.
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where the branded price was below the generic price
back-calculation of elasticity was not possible (19 obser-
vations). Second, a number of implausible estimates of
price elasticities ranging between -3 and -27 (30 obser-
vations) arose, where the branded and generic pack price
were relatively similar in value; probably indicating that
at least in these cases the generic price was not a reason-
able approximation to marginal cost. While this is not
an insignificant reduction in the sample size, the pattern
and range of elasticities remained consistent across
drugs and across countries.
All of the dropped observations used the MSH refer-
ence price where there was no generic in the national
market. There was no clear pattern among the therapeutic
categories as almost all therapeutic categories were affected.
Only five therapeutic categories did not have observations
that were dropped: anxiolytics, diuretics, antiparasitic,
contraceptive and anti-inflammatory medication. Only a
few countries were disproportionately affected. Uganda had
2 observations in the data set and both were outliers.
Jordan and Peru, had similar numbers of computed elastici-
ties that were both in the normal range and considered
outliers. Seven countries: China (Shandong province),
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, and
Tunisia had some outliers but the majority their obser-
vations had computed elasticities in the reported nor-
mal range.
Sensitivity analysis was carried out on the results. First,
generic prices, which were used as proxies for marginal
cost, were varied to see if the results would significantly
change the results: they were increased and decreased
ranging from 5% to 33%. The results showed that esti-
mates stayed within the original range with very few
changes in the country and drug specific results.
Income correlation
Correlations were calculated between price and mea-
sures of income: Gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita, and gross national income (GNI) per capita [21].
Correlations between price and health care expenditure
were also assessed and are shown in Table 3. Three ex-
penditure measures were used: per capita public health ex-
penditure (PHE); total health expenditure (THE) as a % of
GDP; and per capital total health expenditure.
The results suggest little relationship with income
measures: -0.01 to 0.007 (GDP); -0.011 to -0.004 (GNI)
and a weak relationship with expenditure measures
(0.008 to 0.2) and some significance with total health ex-
penditure per capita. This result is not consistent with
some findings where a positive association between a
country’s income and price was found [7,8], but is consist-
ent with a recent study, which might suggest a change in
recent global pricing practices [22]. A small positive rela-
tionship between government health expenditure and the
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
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Figure 3 Average mark-ups across countries.
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Table 2 Elasticity results by molecule name
Molecule name Therapeutic category Country Elasticity Brand pack price ($US) Generic pack price ($US) Pack size
Aciclovir Antiviral Kazakhstan -1.3 17.5 3.9 25
Aciclovir Antiviral Tunisia -1.1 25.0 2.4 25
Aciclovir Antiviral Philippines -1.1 32.8 2.4 25
Aciclovir Antiviral Syria -1.3 21.8 5.0 25
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Jordan -1.4 2.6 0.8 100
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Morocco -1.2 5.1 0.8 100
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Lebanon -1.3 3.4 0.7 100
Amlodipine Calcium channel blocker Malaysia -1.1 8.8 0.4 30
Atenolol Antihypertensive Syria -1.4 5.9 1.7 60
Atenolol Antihypertensive Philippines -1.0 7.4 0.3 28
Beclometasone Asthma Peru -2.0 6.8 3.4 200
Beclometasone Asthma Morocco -1.5 7.9 2.5 200
Benzathine benzylpenicillin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 2.2 0.6 4
Captopril Antihypertensive Morocco -1.5 59.6 20.3 60
Captopril Antihypertensive Malaysia -1.7 3.9 1.6 60
Captopril Antihypertensive Kazakhstan -1.4 5.1 1.6 60
Captopril Antihypertensive Pakistan -1.1 5.6 0.5 60
Captopril Antihypertensive Philippines -1.1 56.2 4.0 150
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kazakhstan -1.8 26.9 12.2 150
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shanghai -1.2 13.1 2.0 100
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shandong -1.2 12.5 2.0 100
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Philippines -1.1 115.1 10.0 500
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kuwait -1.3 12.2 2.9 150
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Malaysia -1.5 6.4 2.0 100
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Syria -1.4 20.2 5.5 150
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic South Africa -1.2 8.5 1.5 1
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Malaysia -1.7 6.1 2.6 1
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.4 10.4 3.0 1
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Philippines -1.4 9.1 2.6 1
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shanghai -1.1 10.2 0.7 1
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shandong -1.0 12.5 0.4 1
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.2 0.2 0.0 1
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Nigeria -1.3 0.9 0.2 1
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Morocco -1.6 2.1 0.8 1
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Philippines -1.0 111.0 3.2 100
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic South Africa -1.1 0.7 0.0 1
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Syria -1.5 0.8 0.3 70
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Tunisia -1.2 1.9 0.3 70
Diazepam Anxiolytic Tunisia -1.8 2.8 1.3 100
Diazepam Anxiolytic Jordan -1.7 0.9 0.4 100
Diazepam Anxiolytic Syria -1.4 3.9 1.2 100
Diazepam Anxiolytic Morocco -1.1 3.8 0.4 100
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Shandong -1.7 9.3 4.0 100
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 9.3 1.9 100
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Philippines -1.0 15.6 0.5 100
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Table 2 Elasticity results by molecule name (Continued)
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Kazakhstan -1.1 27.1 2.1 100
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Morocco -1.1 9.7 0.5 100
Digoxin Cardio therapy Philippines -1.1 28.5 3.3 500
Fluconazole Antifungal South Africa -1.1 107.7 12.3 30
Fluconazole Antifungal Tunisia -1.0 325.9 3.6 30
Fluconazole Antifungal Jordan -1.8 0.2 0.1 1
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Malaysia -1.0 27.5 0.9 30
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shandong -1.4 34.6 10.5 30
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shanghai -1.7 35.1 14.3 30
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Philippines -1.0 49.7 0.8 28
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Morocco -1.4 1.8 0.5 1
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Jordan -2.0 1.0 0.5 1
Furosemide Diueretic Philippines -1.0 3.5 0.1 28
Furosemide Diueretic Jordan -2.0 0.2 0.1 20
Glibenclamide Diabetes Philippines -1.1 14.6 0.8 200
Indinavir Antiviral Morocco -1.9 133.4 62.6 180
Loratadine Antihistamine Syria -1.3 4.2 1.0 20
Loratadine Antihistamine Malaysia -1.1 2.4 0.2 10
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kazakhstan -1.0 1.3 0.0 6
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kyrgyzstan -1.0 1.5 0.0 6
Medroxyprogesterone Contraceptive Kazakhstan -1.2 7.4 1.0 1
Metformin Diabetes Nigeria -1.2 7.1 1.4 100
Metformin Diabetes Pakistan -1.6 1.7 0.7 100
Metformin Diabetes Shanghai -1.2 15.3 2.8 100
Metformin Diabetes Philippines -1.2 11.0 1.8 100
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Syria -1.9 0.8 0.4 20
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Philippines -1.0 24.5 0.4 100
Nevirapine Antiviral Lebanon -1.2 197.8 31.0 60
Nevirapine Antiviral Morocco -1.2 72.3 14.1 60
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Morocco -1.1 41.2 2.2 100
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Kuwait -1.3 11.9 2.4 100
Omeprazole Antacid Shandong -1.1 39.1 3.6 30
Omeprazole Antacid Shanghai -1.3 39.2 8.5 30
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 1.1 0.2 20
Phenytoin Epilepsy Lebanon -1.2 4.1 0.7 100
Phenytoin Epilepsy Kuwait -1.2 3.7 0.7 100
Phenytoin Epilepsy Jordan -1.2 4.6 0.7 100
Phenytoin Epilepsy Tunisia -1.3 3.2 0.7 100
Ranitidine Antacid Philippines -1.1 23.0 1.2 50
Ranitidine Antacid Kazakhstan -1.1 11.7 1.5 60
Ranitidine Antacid Syria -1.3 9.5 2.4 60
Simvastatin Lipid lowering Malaysia -1.1 104.2 10.0 120
Streptomycin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 0.4 0.1 1
Zidovudine Antiviral Lebanon -1.1 296.0 18.6 150
Zidovudine Antiviral Malaysia -1.9 78.8 37.5 100
Source: WHO/HAI 2006.
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price of the drug was also found as shown in Figure 5.
This implies that higher government expenditure on
health is related to having higher priced drugs. These re-
sults have intuitive appeal and are consistent with the gen-
eral findings in the literature [23] Figure 5.
Limitations
While the study was initiated to attempt to estimate a
wide range of pharmaceutical product price elasticities
in low-income countries where data, especially on vol-
umes, is often limited the limitations should be noted.
The analytical approach assumes that firms pay some
attention, at least implicitly, to the Ramsey pricing rule,
but this may not be the case. Second, the results assume
that the proxy used for marginal cost, generic prices or
international procurement prices are reliable measures.
In fact a number of observations had to be excluded
from the analysis where the use of the proxy returned
inadmissible estimates. Further, not all prices gained
from the survey reflect true government procurement
prices. As noted, a small minority of cases drew on data
from government operated hospitals. Furthermore,
elasticities were calculated using standardised pack
sizes which may not necessarily be representative of
pack sizes in each country.
Nevertheless, this study is an exploratory exercise and
the adopted analytical approach ought to be viewed
against the substantial data constraints faced in estimat-
ing demand curves for pharmaceutical products in low-
income countries. Even indirect methods of estimation
prove useful in returning empirical estimates of demand
responsiveness were severe data constraints exist.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to understand the pattern of
pharmaceutical prices across countries and country
price responsiveness. The findings indicate that price
elasticities at the government level range between –1
and –2 across all therapeutic classes studied. Sensitivity
tests found that the results stayed within this range.
While the technique required a number of assumptions
to undertake a back-calculation to overcome data re-
strictions on product volumes, these estimates are a first
attempt at better understanding demand structures in
these settings and should be viewed as suggestive.
That said the evidence presented here suggests that the
price response of low-income countries to pharmaceutical
price, when the product is centrally procured, is robustly
elastic. Moreover there seems little relationship with a
countries income, although some correlation with health
care expenditure levels. Taken together this evidence
would suggest that if pharmaceutical manufacturers do
not price discriminate on the basis of ability to pay, low-
income countries will face market access restrictions to
new products where the global pharmaceutical policy is
aimed to recover high R&D costs.
Possibly as a response to market access restrictions,
explicit pricing policies are not common place in low-
income countries. Such policies are involved and incur
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Elasticity
Source: WHO/HAI 2006
Figure 4 Price elasticity by country.
Table 3 Correlations between price and income, price and expenditure
GDP per capita GNI per capita PHE per capita THE % GDP THE per capita
Pack price -0.000 (0.59) -0.011 (0.55) 0.066 (0.72) 0.120 (0.10) 0.215 (0.05)
Price per pill 0.007 (0.83) -0.004 (0.97) 0.008 (0.35) -0.022 (0.62) 0.050 (0.18)
Note: P-value in parentheses. Source: WHO/HAI 2006; World Bank Development Indicators 2005.
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administration costs [23]. A WHO report noted that
such costs contribute to the low uptake of adopting
pricing policies with only half of all low-income coun-
tries having any pricing policy in place [24,25]. Of
course the implementation of pricing policies requires
the use of reliable data and it is imperative that pro-
curement agencies begin the task of collecting reliable
data on both price and volume in the pharmaceutical
sector—international bodies already involved in pro-
curement for low-income countries could play a key
role. Without such data, policy objectives cannot be
implemented or assessed.
As noted by this study, information on volume would
provide better estimates of price elasticities. A properly
devised longitudinal study would allow for the analysis
of patterns in the demand for medicines over time. Data
collection relating to regulatory and supply issues would
provide insight in the policy implications of pricing and
reimbursement and licensing decisions. In some set-
tings government procurement could play a small role
in medicine access relative to non-governmental bodies
and would shed light on the interaction between these
actors [19,26-28]. Recent efforts by the WHO/HAI, Ac-
cess to Medicines index, Medicines Transparency
Alliance (MeTA) signal an important priority shift in
this area. This study has shown that access to medicines
is a pressing yet complex public health issue. Research
in this area is needed to continue to build evidence to
inform the design of effective pharmaceutical policy and
to contribute to improving access to medicines for
people in low-income countries.
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